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INJUNCTION BONDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION
Alexander T. Henson*
Kenneth F. Gray**
INTRODUCTION
The preliminary injunction' is a popular tool for plaintiffs
pressing environmental rights.' The immediate object of such
a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
there is a full hearing on the merits of the case. 3 Plaintiffs'
ability to be heard by the court during the early stages of envi-
ronmental litigation' is often decisive, for many environmental
cases are fought "in the very shadow of the bulldozer blades.'
© 1979 by Alexander T. Henson and Kenneth F. Gray.
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The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not purport to
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1. The preliminary injunction is also referred to as a "temporary injunction,"
"provisional injunction," injunction "pendente lite," or "interlocutory injunction."
See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 106 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
REMEDIES]; Dobbs, Should Security be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional
Relief?, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1974).
2. Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A Primer for
the Practioner, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639 (1977). Monetary damages are not an acceptable
form of relief for most public interest litigants since the harm accrues to the environ-
ment and the public in general, making it inequitable and meaningless to award
damages to individual plaintiffs. Id. at 644-45.
3. V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
§ 6:13, at 382 (1972); J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 116 (1970); J. BRECHER &
M. NESTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 99 (1970). Brecher and Nestle state that
the preliminary injunction is "vitally important" because it eliminates the defendant's
possible strategy of delay. Id.
4. For purposes of this discussion, we define "environmental litigation" as those
cases brought both to enforce federal, state, and local environmental protection laws
and to protect resources of the natural environment, such as land, air, water, flora and
fauna. Cf. Leshy, supra note 2, at 639 n.1 (offering a similar definition).
5. Sive, Securing Expert Witnesses, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (1970). Environ-
mental claims are often asserted "at the last minute," although not usually by choice.
Potential plaintiffs find it valuable to lobby the decision-making process to avert the
deleterious effects on the environment and do not wish to alienate potential defendants
by filing suit unless absolutely necessary. It is also important to avoid the ripeness
doctrine by presenting a concrete "case and controversy." Thus, environmental liti-
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It is not surprising, therefore, that preliminary injunctions
have been issued extensively in enforcing the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA),8 various state environmental
policy acts,' nuisance law,8 the public trust doctrine,' and
media-specific environmental laws,'" which together constitute
gants must wait until there is a decision which clearly permits the objectionable project
to go ahead. Once that critical decision is made, the only possible barrier between the
bulldozer and environmental destruction is a court order.
6. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 798-809 (1977). Suits are most
often brought to enforce section 102 of the Act which requires an adequate environmen-
tal impact statement. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. §
4332 (1976).
7. For an explanation of the various state environmental policy acts and the
cases brought under them, see generally W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 809; R. BURCHELL
& D. LImTOKIN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT HANDBOOK 7-36 (1974); Yost, NEPA's Pro-
geny: State Environmental Policy Acts, [1973] III ENVT'L L. REP. (ENVT'L LAW INST.)
50090; Cal. Office of Planning & Research, California Environmental Quality Act
Litigation Study (Apr., 1976) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
8. The significance of nuisance law in environmental litigation is not to be ig-
nored. Professor Rodgers observes:
The infinite variety of wrongs covered by this amorphous theory is
well known to any student of the law. . . . There is simply no common
law doctrine that approaches nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as
a regulator of land use and of technological abuse. Nuisance actions have
involved pollution of all physical media-air, water, land-by a wide
variety of means. . . . Nuisance theory and case law is the common law
backbone of modem environmental and energy law.
W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 100. See Warren, Nuisance Law as an Enviromental Tool,
7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (1974); MacBeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (2d)
of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972); Hashin, Private Nuis-
ance Law: Protection of the Individual's Environmental Rights, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1162
(1974).
An injunction is a frequent common law remedy for nuisance. See W. RODGERS,
supra note 6, at 143-54; REMEDIES, supra note 1, at 357, and cases collected therein.
See generally Newsom, State Court Injunctions and Their Enforcement in Environ-
mental Litigation, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821 (1978). Where codified, nuisance law com-
monly provides for injunctive relief. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3491, 3501 (West 1970).
9. See W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 170-86, and cases collected therein.
10. E.g., Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a) (1976). This
section, in pertinent part, reads: "The district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in controversy, to restrain [a] person from violating [a]
noise control requirement or to order [the] Administrator to perform [an] act or
duty, as the case may be .... " Id.
The California Coastal Act also invites citizen enforcement via the preliminary
injunction: "Any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief
to restrain any violation of this division. On a prima facie showing of a violation of
this division, preliminary equitable relief shall be issued to restrain any further viola-
tion. . . " CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30803 (West 1977).
Injunctive remedies are also implied by the courts where they are not expressly
provided for by statute. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963). For a discussion of implied private
remedies under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, see W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at
396-97.
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a significant portion of the environmental lawsuits filed by
private plaintiffs."
In most of these cases, however, the plaintiff is required to
post a bond, make an undertaking, or provide other security to
the court before the preliminary injunction is issued. In envi-
ronmental litigation and especially in those cases where the
plaintiffs are citizens or non-profit groups, this requirement
frequently precludes the assertion of environmental rights and
environmental protections," or works to penalize environmen-
tal plaintiffs in a close case. A number of courts have at-
tempted to remedy this problem by setting low or nominal
bonds for non-profit environmental organizations in NEPA liti-
gation,' 3 but given the discretion that courts are granted in
setting bonds, the problem of prohibitively high bonds remains
fundamentally unresolved."
The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of bonds
upon the issuance of preliminary injunctions in environmental
litigation. First, the preliminary injunction standard and bond-
ing requirement will be discussed in order to explicate the justi-
fications for injunction bonding. The effects of injunction
bonds on plaintiffs, defendants, and environmental quality will
then be examined and the rationale for the bonds' elimination
will be considered. Finally, legislative trends will be analyzed
with a view towards establishing an equitable solution to the
problem of preliminary injunction bonds in environmental liti-
gation.
While all non-governmental plaintiffs may be inhibited by
the prospect of a substantial bond, the following analysis is
restricted to "public interest" environmental plaintiffs. It is
these plaintiffs who most frequently have trouble meeting the
bond requirement and for whom there is the least justification
11. Injunctions have also been sought to enforce the environmental protections
embodied in the state constitutions. See Frye, Environmental Provisions in State
Constitutions, [1975] V ENVT'L L. REP. (ENVT'L LAW INST.) 50028, and cases cited
therein.
12. Environmental damage is often irreversible. If the plaintiff is forced to forego
a preliminary injunction, he may find the case moot by the time a final injunction can
be heard. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 1971); Citizens Comm.
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1970).
13. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 672 n.152, and cases cited therein.
14. Moreover, the California legislature has recently considered several bills that
would require bonds as undertakings for plaintiffs seeking relief or judicial review in
environmental actions where they are not now required. The propriety of this legisla-
tion, however, is clearly debatable. See notes 165-75 and accompanying text infra.
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for its imposition. By definition, public interest environmental
plaintiffs need not be of any particular number or legal status,'
although it is clear that they must not be acting primarily in
their own economic interest. Plaintiffs may be said to be liti-
gating in the public interest when they 1) seek to vindicate a
strong public policy'" which will 2) benefit a substantial num-
ber of persons" or 3) present important legal questions.'8
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE BOND REQUIREMENT
In order to adequately discuss the preliminary injunction
bond and its effects on environmental litigation, it is necessary
to have a clear understanding of the role of bonds in non-
specialized litigation. Since the bond question only comes into
play after the court decides that a preliminary injunction is
warranted, it is appropriate to begin with an examination of
the preliminary injunction and its issuance.
The preliminary injunction is a form of provisional relief,
granted as an emergency measure before a full hearing can be
held, requiring a defendant to refrain from a particular act.'"
It is issued only after the defendant is notified and has had an
opportunity to defend himself in court,2" although once a defen-
dant is so notified, he may have only a few days to prepare his
case.22 The hearing is short, informal, and limited in scope.22
The evidence presented, however, must go beyond the unveri-
15. E.g., incorporated, unincorporated, non-profit, or tax-exempt.
16. Almost all national and state environmental policies fit into this category.
The past several years have made it abundantly clear that protection of
environmental quality is a high-ranking priority amply justifying ...
judicial encouragements. . . .At every level of government, new stat-
utes, administrative systems and litigation emphasize our seriousness in
addressing both local and systemic environmental problems. In the vast
majority of environmental cases, therefore, there should be no question
that a strong public policy is intimately involved. [footnote omitted].
King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation,
41 TENN. L. REv. 27, 65 (1973).
17. The term "person" is defined to include only natural persons, i.e., human
beings.
18. See King & Plater, supra note 16, at 68-69. This discussion applies to any
private group that meets the definition. Note, however, that it is limited by the defini-
tion of "environmental litigation" presented in note 4, supra.
19. See REMEDIES, supra note 1, at 106.
20. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527(a) (West Supp.
1979). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2949 at 468 (1973); 2 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 1523-32 (2d ed. 1970).
21. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, at 471.
22. Id.
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fied allegations. Although the typical form of proof is by affida-
vit, 3 oral testimony is preferred by most courts. 4
The attenuated nature of the preliminary injunction hear-
ing makes it subject to both judicial error and abuse by frivo-
lous litigants. Without limits on the ability of the courts to
issue preliminary injunctions, defendants would be overly vul-
nerable to these dangers.2 5 Accordingly, two safeguards have
been established to ensure that preliminary injunctions are not
issued erroneously and, if so, that they do not damage the
defendants wrongfully enjoined. The first restraint is the pre-
liminary injunction standard, which limits the remedy to situa-
tions of serious need. The bonding requirement comprises the
second restraint, and provides security to defendants erro-
neously enjoined.
The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions
The preliminary injunction standard has been subject to
a "dizzying diversity of formulations. 21 6 Nevertheless, there are
two initial requirements common to this form of equitable re-
lief. One is that preliminary relief issues to "preserve the status
quo, or, more accurately, to preserve or create that state of
affairs in which effective relief can be awarded to either party
at the trial's conclusion." The other concept, normally ap-
plied in equity proceedings, is that the plaintiff must lack an
effective legal remedy.28 Thus, preliminary injunctions are con-
sidered "extraordinary relief."
The majority of courts" and statutes30 regularly require
that the plaintiff satisfy four prerequisites to be entitled to a
preliminary injunction. These prerequisites are: 1) that the
plaintiff is likely to succeed when the case is later decided on
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., REMEDIES, supra note 1, at 106-07.
25. Id.; Dobbs, supra note 1, passim.
26. Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 525,
526 (1978).
27. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAtv. L. REV. 994, 1057-58 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Injunctions]. See REMEDIES, supra note 1, at 109; 11 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2948, at 463-66; see also Nussbaum, Temporary Re-
straining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions-The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265,
275-76 (1972).
28. See REMEDIES, supra note 1, at 57-62; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
20, § 2944, at 392.
29. E.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189,193 (4th Cir.
1977); Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 92, 95-97 (D. Minn. 1970).
30. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 1954).
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the merits; 2) that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury to
legal rights if the relief is not granted; 3) that the harm to the
defendant if relief is granted does not outweigh the harm to the
plaintiff should the relief not be granted; and 4) that the public
interest is served by granting the relief.3
There are frequent minor variations on these prerequisites.
A number of jurisdictions group the harm to the plaintiff and
the defendant together and denote it "balancing of the equi-
ties" or the "balancing of convenience"; 32 other jurisdictions
require a "substantial harm" rather than an "irreparable in-
jury" to one party or the other.3 Despite these variations, no
difference in result has been perceived from the application of
the different formulations.3'
One variant, the "likelihood" of plaintiff's victory at a full
hearing on the merits, could substantially affect a court's deci-
sion whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction.35 The
federal courts have used at least fourteen formulations of this
requirement," ranging from "reasonable certainty" to mere
"possibility" with "reasonable probability of success" the most
popular choice.37 Assuming a different formulation will produce
a different standard, this result has an impact not only upon
31. See, e.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2948, at 430-31; Leshy,
supra note 2, at 641.
32. 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04(1)-.04(2), at 65.42-.47, 65.50-.55 (2d ed.
1975). For an examination of the development of this balancing concept, see Leubsdorf,
supra note 26, at 533-34. See also Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial
Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974) (emergence of balancing test in nuisance law).
33. See Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 526 & nn.9 & 11; Leshy, supra note 2, at
641 n.9. Note the distinction between "harm" and "injury to legal rights." Only the
latter qualifies for protection by the courts. Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 541.
34. Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 526; Leshy, supra note 2, at 641 n.9. However,
Professor Leubsdorf suggests that his model may result in different outcomes if care-
fully applied. Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 541-44.
35. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 642. Contra, 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 20, § 2948, at 451-52.
36. The formulations are listed in 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, §
2948, at 450 nn.54 & 55, as follows: reasonable certainty, strong probability, substantial
probability, clear showing of probable success, probability, reasonable probability of
success, probable cause for success, substantial likelihood, reasonable likelihood, like-
lihood, probable chance, reasonably good chance, reasonable possibility, and possibil-
ity.
Compare, for example, the ways in which the federal courts have characterized
the showing made by several plaintiffs: Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesin-
ger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971) (stronger showing as to the likelihood of success
on the merits); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.S.D. 1971) (probable right and
probable damage); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 331 F. Supp.
925 (D.D.C. 1971) (substantial showing of likelihood of noncompliance with the law).
37. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2948, at 450-51.
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the initial decision to issue preliminary relief in a given case
but also upon the preliminary injunction standard as a source
of protection for the defendants. The ultimate result will not
differ, however, where the court requires the plaintiff to show,
for example, a "possibility" of success on the merits, if it also
requires a stronger probability that the plaintiff will be seri-
ously injured. Courts have often approved this approach to
probability of outcome and seriousness of harm."
The touchstones of the preliminary injunction, then, are
irreparable harm and a reasonable probability of success on the
merits. These standards ensure that the preliminary injunction
will issue only in extraordinary circumstances where the court
is reasonably confident of its preliminary decision.
The Bond Requirement
Generally, bond requirements are either mandatory or
within the discretion of the court. Most states have a general 3
statute or judicial rule granting the trial courts authority to
require bonds of plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief.4 0 The
states requiring some form of security before a preliminary in-
junction is issued generally use statutes based on either the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" (hereinafter the Federal
Rule) or the New York Code of 1848,42 although a number of
states have formulated original approaches. 3 A majority of
state statutes, however, follow the Federal Rule section 65(c),
which provides, in part, that "no restraining order or prelimini-
ary injunction will issue except upon the giving of security...
in such sum as the court deems proper."" It should be noted
that while many of these statutes appear mandatory, some
courts have been liberal in their interpretation such that, in
38. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) (per
Frank, J.); Semmeo Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970);
Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1973). See Note, Probability
of Ultimate Success Held Unnecessary for Grant of Interlocutory Injunction, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 165 (1971).
39. For purposes of this discussion, a "general" bonding provision is one that
does not refer to the subject matter of any lawsuit.
40. See Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1096-97, 1173 app. I.
41. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
42. California, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.
43. Arkansas, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and West Virginia.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
1979]
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practice, the exaction of a bond is clearly within the trial
judge's discretion. 5 The different circuits of the federal court
of appeals, for example, have reached opposite conclusions re-
garding the Federal Rule.46 Other state courts with federally
derived statutes have not interpreted the mandatory language
in the bond requirement.'
The California statute is derived from the New York Code
and states that:
On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require
. . a written undertaking. . ., with sufficient sureties, to
the effect that he will pay to the party enjoined such dam-
ages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, as such
party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court
finally decides that the applicant was not entitled
thereto. 8
Some California courts have emphasized that the bond is abso-
lutely mandatory for plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief.4" In
contrast, about twelve states have statutes leaving the matter
of security to the judge's discretion. 0 In these states, plaintiffs
can effectively argue that the legislature intended to give the
judge maximum flexibility and the ability to require no bond
in the proper situation.
In both mandatory and discretionary jurisdictions, the
judge is given the power to set the bond as he "deems proper.",
In theory, the court is to set a bond in a sum that will ade-
quately protect the defendant from the costs and damages
caused by the issuance of a wrongful preliminary injunction."
In practice, however, the amount set is largely unrestrained by
this doctrine. 3
45. See Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1097, 1105.
46. Id. at 1099-101.
47. Id. at 1105-06.
48. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 529 (West 1954).
49. Biasca v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 366, 228 P. 861 (1924); Griffin v. Lima,
124 Cal. App. 2d 697, 269 P.2d 191 (1954). Contra, Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842,
523 P.2d 682, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974); Brown v. Pitchess, 37 Cal. App. 3d 501, 112
Cal. Rptr. 350 (1974).
50. Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
51. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
52. Brashear Freight Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 952, 953 (W.D.
Mo. 1941).
53. Stockslager v. Caroll Elec. Co-op Corp., 528 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1976). See 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 2954, at 525.
[Vol. 19
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In addition, since the main purpose of the bond require-
ment is to compensate the defendant for erroneously caused
damages, no bond is necessary where the defendant will sustain
no harm in complying with the injunction." The court may also
exercise its discretionary power in setting the amount of the
bond at a level that is below the actual damage sustainable by
the erroneously enjoined party in cases where the plaintiffs are
impecunious and pressing an issue of public concern. 55 Thus, a
trial judge's ability to set low or nominal bonds in both manda-
tory and discretionary jurisdictions often leads to forum-
shopping where judicial predelictions are known.
Appellate review of the bond set by the trial court is not
uncommon. If the appellate court determines that the trial
judge abused his discretion in setting the amount of the bond,
the court can order a new bond in a specific amount" or remand
the case to the lower court with directions to set the bond in a
proper amount." The court's failure to require the posting of a
bond has also been held to be reversible error,5" except where
the defendant would suffer no damage by the injunction or
where the plaintiff is financially unable to post a bond and
seeks to further the public interest. In addition, while numer-
ous trial courts have abused their discretion by requiring a
large bond,5 only a small handful of courts have ever been
reversed for requiring a nominal bond. 0
A defendant damaged by an erroneous injunction may
prove such damages' in court and receive indemnity up to the
54. International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974), appeal after remand, 535 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1976), appeal
after remand, 556 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1977); Steward v. West, 449 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.
1971).
55. E.g., Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (C.D.N.Y. 1971); Powelton Civic
Homeowner's Ass'n v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 234 F. Supp. 809 (D. Pa.
1968); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1975);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Burger v. County of Mendocino,
45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975).
57. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1059 (4th Cir.
1972).
58. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 464 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.
1972).
59. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 516 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1974);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1659 (4th Cir. 1972); West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
60. E.g., Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Attorneys' fees are normally included in costs and damages. For a review of
19791
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amount of the bond." Damages must be proved with the requi-
site degree of certainty. Nominal damages are also recovera-
ble. 3 The award of any damages to the defendant, however, is
not automatic, and rests within the discretion of the court."
There appear to be no environmental cases where a court
awarded damages on the bond. 5
Rationale for the Injunction Bond
Injunction bonds serve two basic functions: 1) deterrence
and 2) compensation. As a deterrent, the injunction bond dis-
courages the plaintiff from seeking "extraordinary" relief frivo-
lously. The justification behind this deterrence function is that
it provides "a means of guaranteeing that the provisional relief
is sought only by those in genuine need of such relief and rea-
sonably confident of the outcome."" Thus, the danger in allow-
various state laws, see Annot., 164 A.L.R. 1088 (1946); Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1133-
36. For an example of the federal approach, see Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n
v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (D. Pa. 1968); K-2 Ski Co.
v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974).
California follows this general rule. E.g., Porter v. Hopkins, 63 Cal. 53 (1883);
Surety Say. & Loan Ass'n v. National Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 3d 752, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1970). See also Quint, Attorneys Fees-An Item of Damage, 41 L.A. B. BULL.
367 (1966).
62. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, §§ 2971-2974; Dobbs,
supra note 1, at 1121-46; Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73
HARV. L. REv. 333, 339-53 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Injunctions and the Injunction
Bond]. Some states allow the defendant damages over and beyond the amount of the
bond. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 12 (1957); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4447 (1974); Davis
v. Poitevant & Favre Lumber Co., 15 La. App. 657, 132 So. 790 (1931); Johnson v.
McMahan, 40 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
63. See note 62 supra.
64. Id.
65. Apparently, preliminary injunctions on environmental matters are almost
always upheld; further, nominal bonds discourage attempts at recovery. Leshy, supra
note 2, at 675.
66. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1094.
The requirement of confidence in one's ultimate victory has been framed in this
way:
The requirement of a bond may deter plaintiffs who are unsure of
their claims from asking for the extraordinary relief provided by ex parte
orders or preliminary injunctions. Although some plaintiffs may be un-
able to raise security adequate to satisfy the bond requirement and so
may be denied anticipatory relief, the bond must nevertheless be exacted
to enable the court to act upon the summary process.
Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, supra note 62, at 337. The justification as as-
serted by this author appears to beg the question.
The deterrence function was clearly the purpose for requiring bonds of California
litigants in actions against public entities under CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 947 and 951. The
avowed intent of the Legislature was "to deter litigation-prone persons from instituting
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ing frivolous cases to go to a preliminary hearing is that
"enormous pressure" may be generated against a defendant"
and judicial time wasted. If a bond in a substantial amount is
not required, the logic continues, the courts and defendants
will surely be subjected to numerous frivolous actions.
The seriousness of these claims, however, is overstated as
applied to the public interest plaintiff. First, while all attor-
neys have a duty not to file frivolous or unmeritorious cases, 8
it would appear that it is ultimately a decision for the court
whether relief is genuinely needed. The requirement of a bond
adds nothing to the attorney's duty, except to place another
procedural hurdle in the path of plaintiffs. 9 Second, the com-
plexity of environmental litigation demands a detailed knowl-
edge of complex areas of fact and law, a commitment not nor-
mally undertaken lightly.70 Third, the enormous expense of
unfounded litigation" against public entities and employees, as these defendants were
thought to be subject to a greater number of unmeritorious litigation than private
defendants. A. VAN ALSTYNE, GOVERNMENT TORT LLAaILrrY 785 (1964). See discussion
in Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 453, 535 P.2d 713, 715, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585, 587 (1975). While the statute limited the amount of the bond automatically
allowable to a nominal amount ($100-200), this amount could be increased upon appli-
cation of the defendant for good cause shown. CAL. Gov'T CODE § § 947, 951 (West Supp.
1979).
67. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1094.
68. ABA CANONs OF PROvassIONAL ETHIcs No. 7, § 102(A)(1)-102(A)(2) (1975).
Virtually all states have comparable provisions. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076,
Rule 2-110 (West Supp. 1978).
69. Undoubtedly, the prevailing attitude is expressed in this statement by a
California environmental plaintiffs attorney: "None of us-and that includes the
State Bar Committee on the Environment and the San Francisco Bar Committee on
the Environment, as well as responsible groups such as the Planning and Conservation
League-wants frivolous litigation around to tarnish our profession, efforts, and repu-
tations." Letter from Antonio Rossmann, Esq., to Governor Edmond G. Brown, Jr.
(August 28, 1978) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
70. [W]hile some environmental work-such as challenging a pro-
ject which has been authorized in violation of some clear procedural
requirement-may involve simple issues of fact and law, more frequently
environmental defense involves issues in which arguments about complex
chemical, biological, ecological, and economic matters lie at the center
of the controversy ...
Trubeck, Environmental Defense, I: Introduction to Interest Group Advocacy in Com-
plex Disputes, in PUaLIc INTEREST LAw 151, 152 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978). Effective
advocacy mandates a working knowledge of the relevant issues. In discussing a cam-
paign against several water resources development programs, the authors noted: "The
dispute over each project became a protracted battle. Even the simplest form of chal-
lenge to a project required mastery of complex technical environmental and economic
data." Trubeck & Gillen, Environmental Defense, I1: Examining the Limits of Interest
Group Advocacy in Complex Disputes, in PUBuc INTErnsT LAw 195, 215 (B. Weisbrod
ed. 1978).
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time and money involved in litigation is a deterrent to frivolous
suits. Finally, according to the charter of many public interest
groups, litigation must be internally reviewed and approved on
several levels before it is commenced.
7
'
The fear that defendants will be harmed by "enormous
pressure" is mitigated by the defendant's confidence in his own
victory where the action is without substance. Where the action
is meritorious, the pressure appears justified and inevitable.
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff who is in
genuine need of relief and reasonably confident of the outcome
will be able to post the required security. On the other hand,
the plaintiff who is neither in great need of provisional relief
nor confident of the outcome may well possess the financial
resources to post a large bond. There is little, if any, relation
between the ability of the plaintiff to post a bond and the need
for relief or confidence in victory. In short, the bond require-
ment is unjustified as a tool of deterrence and presents a seri-
ous obstacle to environmental litigation.
The second major function of the bond is to provide
compensation to the defendants for damage incurred by "un-
meritorious" temporary restraints.7" Where provisional relief
is granted but a final injunction refused, the defendant may
suffer monetary damage in complying with the "unmeritori-
ous" preliminary injunction. The justification for compensa-
tion is that, given the short time in which the defendant must
assemble his arguments, provisional relief is "especially prone
to error." 73
The compensation function, then, involves two concerns
that must be present in sufficient degree if the bond require-
ment is to be justified. First, a final injunction must be refused
71. E.g., the Natural Resources Defense Council requires three separate approv-
als within the organization before an action is brought: that of the legal staff, the Legal
Committee of the Board of Trustees, and the Executive Committee of the Board of
Trustees. Adams, Responsible Militancy-The Anatomy of a Public Interest Law
Firm, 29 REc. A. B. Crry N.Y. 631, 635-36 (1974).
72. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1094. See Venice Canals Resident Homeowner's Ass'n
v. Superior Court, "/2 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 140 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1977) (stay bond).
"Unmeritorious," as used here, does not mean "frivolous" or refer to actions with
no legal merit. Rather, hereinafter, a preliminary injunction is unmeritorious if, after
a full hearing on the merits, a permanent injunction is not issued. See Comment,
Injunction Bond Amounts in Federal NEPA Litigation, 61 IowA L. Rav. 580, 580 n.3
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Bond Amounts in NEPA Litigationj.
73. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1094. See Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, supra
note 62, at 336. It should be recalled that provisional relief is often a powerful remedy.
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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with some degree of frequency after preliminary relief has been
granted. That is, for it to be said that provisional relief is more
prone to error, final injunctions must be refused in a significant
number of cases. The second component requires a significant
harm to defendants who have been subject to unmeritorious
preliminary restraint. Thus, the bond is valuable as a compen-
satory tool only if an ascertainable economic loss is incurred by
defendants who comply with preliminary injunctions that are
not made final.
To justify bonding, the courts must frequently issue erro-
neous preliminary injunctions causing economic losses to the
defendants. Few defendants, however, appear to suffer serious
economic losses due to erroneous preliminary injunctions in
environmental litigation, and the sizable majority of these in-
junctions are ultimately legitimized by the issuance of a final
injunction.
THE CASE FOR ELIMINATING INJUNCTION BONDS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
There are three ways in which a bond may inhibit access
to preliminary relief. First, the plaintiff may be deterred by the
cost of the bond premium." Second, the plaintiff may be inhib-
ited by the threat of personal liability on the bond.75 Third, the
environmental plaintiff may not be able to obtain a bond
within the time allotted: a particular problem when the plain-
tiff is seen as pressing an unpopular cause.7" The bond under-
writer cannot and does not estimate the likelihood of plaintiff's
success at a final hearing. Instead, the bondsman estimates the
likelihood that the plaintiff will respond to any damages cov-
ered by the bond. One of the reasons that substantial bonds are
inappropriate in environmental ligitation is that certain as-
sumptions, valid in evaluating plaintiffs in nonspecialized liti-
gation, are not true for environmental plaintiffs acting in the
public interest.
In environmental litigation, plaintiffs and defendants are
not likely to be in relative economic parity. It is unreasonable
74. The cost of a premium may run from twenty to thirty dollars per year per
one thousand dollars. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1112.
75. Id. See also Dimento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in the States: An
Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413, 448-49 (1976). Security bonds may also have an inhibiting
effect if associated with governmental hostility toward those who would become in-
volved in environmental affairs. Id. at 449.
76. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1112-13.
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to extend the bond requirement to environmental litigation
where individual citizens and nonprofit organizations routinely
lack the necessary resources for posting a bond."
A 1973 study by the Council on Environmental Quality
indicated that sixty-one percent of the environmental groups
surveyed relied on dues and small donations as their primary
source of income. Sixty-nine per cent had annual budgets of
less than $5,000, from which postage, telephone, research, du-
plication of materials, and travel to meetings and public hear-
ings were paid. The study found that "[1]itigation is limited
for most environmental groups unless an attorney will work for
little or no fee. Often day-to-day expenses are paid out of the
pockets of a group's more active members.""8
Litigation is expensive. A 1974 survey of environmental
actions in Michigan under the Michigan Environmental Pro-
tection Act7" revealed that the average environmental lawsuit
entails expenses of around $10,000 if trial ensues, with about
half that amount spent on attorneys' fees. 0 Expert witnesses
and consultants absorbed about $3,000.81 If the case was settled
without trial, plaintiffs incurred costs of about $2,000.82 Un-
doubtedly, litigation expenses have risen since 1974. Clearly,
litigation is out of reach for most environmental organizations,
and even where money exists for these purposes, it does not
provide for more than a nominal bond.83
77. See Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A
Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003, 1076 (1972). Another article notes: "In an area
incapable of accurate quantification, we suspect that the predominant factor inhibit-
ing meritorious public interest environmental litigation is the lack of money." King &
Plater, supra, note 16, at 29.
78. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FOURTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 398-99, 404 n.8 (1973).
Professor Bryden of the University of Minnesota in 1978 commented about that
state's paucity of citizen environmental litigation by noting: "As a rule, none of the
statewide environmental organizations can afford to pay all the expenses associated
with even a single lawsuit. At most, they pay out-of-pocket expenses while in varying
degrees the attorneys donate their time." Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theory and
Practice, 62 MINN. L. REV. 163, 213 (1978).
79. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
80. Sax & Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience
Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 51 (1974).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. One obvious . .. disadvantage is the inequality of means. The
ad hoc citizens group or regional or national conservation organization,
the typical plaintiff, has little money and no paid legal staff. Every prod-
uct and service that goes into substantial litigation-lawyers, typists,
photostats, expert witnesses-must generally be wholly or substantially
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Some tax-exempt, non-profit environmental groups do
possess modest litigation budgets. The existence of these spe-
cial funds, however, should not be taken into account by the
court in setting injunction bonds. This economic support goes
mainly to essential salaries and is the sine qua non for most
environmental suits;8 1 little if any is left over for bond costs and
nothing is wasted. One court that did consider plaintiffs' aggre-
gate assets in setting a large bond was reversed on appeal.8 5 The
same governmental policies favoring non-taxation of these or-
ganizations militates in favor of low or nominal bonds.86 Non-
profit groups should not be forced to risk their assets as security
to post a bond, regardless of the size of those assets.
donated. The opposing administrative agency, often joined by a large
corporation which wishes to appropriate a natural resource, has virtually
unlimited or at least ample means. To it, the large litigating expense is
only a small fraction of the project cost and may be deemed part of
overhead.
Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 617, 618 (1970).
84. See King & Plater, supra note 16, at 79.
85. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1657 (E.D.N.C.
1972), the district court required a bond of $75,000 after considering the plaintiffs'
collective assets of $4,400,000, all but $200,000 of which was attributable to the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation. On appeal, the reviewing court rejected the large bond as
a condition for the preliminary injunction. Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1659 (4th Cir. 1972). The district court issued the preliminary injunc-
tion without a bond on remand. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 355 F.
Supp. 280 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
The three largest national environmental litigators-the Environmental Defense
Fund, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil-have separate litigation funds, as well as substantial assets and yet have regularly
received low or nominal bonds in NEPA litigation. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 672
n.152, and cases cited therein. Courts have similarly declined to consider the fact that
the plaintiff received tax-exempt funds in awarding attorneys' fees. E.g., La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, [1974] 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1891 (1st Cir.
1973). See King & Plater, supra note 16, at 75-76.
86. See generally Letter and Enclosure from Russell E. Train, Chairman, Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, to Randolph W. Thrower, Commissioner, Internal Reve-
nue Service (Sept. 30, 1970), reprinted in [19701 1 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 745, wherein it
is stated:
[Tihe worthwhile objectives of private environmental litigation are not
likely to be met by taxable groups alone. It is necessary to have organiza-
tions capable of receiving contributions which have charitable contribu-
tion status under our tax laws if the interests of our environmental pro-
grams are to be fully represented.
• . • The crucial consideration [as to whether organizations receive
tax exempt status] appears to be whether the benefits flowing from liti-
gations inhere primarily and principally to the general public rather than
to private interests.
Id. at 746.
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In like manner, it is undesirable to require individual citi-
zens to risk enormous liability for the sake of a lawsuit when
their individual interest is but a tiny part of the larger public
interest. To require an individual to risk ruinous personal lia-
bility in these circumstances is tantamount to a penalty for the
assertion of a public right. This point is illustrated by Save El
Toro Association v. Days.87 There, the plaintiffs, including in-
dividual citizens and an unincorporated association, were given
the choice of posting a $50,000 bond or losing the preliminary
injunction to which they were entitled. Rather than lose the
injunction, one plaintiff abandoned his homestead and offered
all his real property, stocks, and bonds as security for the in-junction bond.8 The plaintiff clearly risked financial ruin if the
preliminary injunction was not sustained. Fortunately for this
plaintiff, a final injunction was granted. Yet-individual plain-
tiffs in environmental litigation are faced with just such a
choice all too often.
The threat of a large bond also has a fundamental effect
on the strategy of environmental dispute resolution. Where
preliminary relief is precluded, the potential litigant is forced
to consider other avenues of relief both within and without the
judicial system. Several of these possible strategy alternatives
warrant further discussion.
If the bond problem is recognized early, environmental
protection may be realized through an appeal to legislative and
administrative tribunals, or to public enforcers. These alterna-
tives, however, are usually pursued prior to litigation in any
case.
Where court action is inevitable, tactics may be aimed at
avoiding preliminary relief by seeking other remedies. When
the facts are reasonably clear, it may be possible to file for a
declaratory judgment or a permanent injunction and then
immediately move for a summary judgment. However, since
these actions are given no special priority, the case may not be
decided before the defendant has either damaged the environ-
ment or violated the applicable law.
Where a preliminary injunction is lost for failure to post a
bond, the plaintiff may be able to persuade the court to exact
a promise from the defendant that he will not act until advance
87. 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977).
88. Conversation with Bruce Tichinin, attorney for the plaintiffs (Jan. 2, 1979).
[Vol. 19
1979] INJUNCTION BONDING
notice is given to the court and to the plaintiff." If speed is a
necessity, however, or if the judge is not willing to require no-
tice of the defendant, there may be no choice but to suffer the
environmental damage.
In some instances, a plaintiff should try to consolidate the
hearing on a preliminary injunction with the trial on the merits
under Federal Rule 65(a)(2). ° When consolidation is permit-
ted, a bond is not required, litigation costs are reduced, the
court may grant both affirmative and negative relief, and the
impact of the defendant's claims of injury may be reduced."
The major disadvantage of consolidation is that both the plain-
tiff and defendant may lack time to prepare their cases."
Courts may also be reluctant to order an expedited hearing if
they feel that the defendants will not be given fair notice and
an opportunity to be adequately heard. 3
In the final analysis, substantial injunction bonds discour-
age environmental litigation. Environmental plaintiffs lack the
resources necessary to meet such bonds, and where resources
are available either from individual citizens or through a citi-
zens' group, it is unfair and undesirable to require private par-
ties to risk liability for the enforcement of a public right. The
89. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728,
738, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (where the court required defendants to keep the court
currently advised as to the status of a dam project and refused a temporary injunction;
an injunction was issued after trial on the merits). See also J. SAX, supra note 3, at
116-17.
Bonds have also been required of defendants in lieu of the issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction, apparently under the general equity power of the courts. See United
States v. Dominion Oil Co., 241 F. 425 (S.D. Cal. 1917); In re Ball's Estate, 81
N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Such a procedure is not much aid to the environmental
plaintiff who usually cannot be recompensed in money for the defendant's environmen-
tal damage.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). The practice is not uncommon in environmental
cases. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Foster Park v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1972);
Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Kleppe, 425 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1976); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Stamm, 6 E.R.C. 1525 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Concerned
Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 388 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
91. Leshy, supra note 2, at 667-68.
92. J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra note 3, at 99, state:
Many conservationist attorneys report that a trial under these condi-
tions is one of the most difficult tasks to face. Tremendous time pressure
often precludes the detailed discovery program usually needed to learn
about the complicated technical facts in the case. These facts are usually
in the possession of the defendant. As a result the conservationist attor-
ney must often elicit the facts from witnesses for the first time in court-a
perilous course. [citations omitted].
93. See Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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effect of a substantial bond may well be to penalize the plain-
tiff for a good-faith attempt to vindicate the environmental
laws, or to force the plaintiff to use less effective tactics.
The Compensation Function
As previously noted, compensation for defendant's expen-
ses in complying with the preliminary injunctions is one com-
mon justification for bonds. In many cases, however, the need
for compensation is negligible and there are good reasons for
viewing the cost of complying with the court's order as merely
another cost of litigation. It is, in this light, profitable to
examine further the need for compensation and the rationales
for requiring the defendant to bear the costs of carrying out the
court's order.
The usual argument offered in support of bonding is that
if substantial bonds are not required, and the restraint is erro-
neous, public and private projects will suffer significant in-
creased costs due to inflation, lost wages for contractors and
workers, lost rental income, and temporary construction. 4
Thus, at least in the case of public projects, both users and
private developers are injured. If the project is private, the
immediate loss falls almost exclusively on the private devel-
oper. It is not surprising, therefore, that the construction indus-
try has led the fight in California to pass legislation that would
require substantial bonds. 5
One of the construction industry's chief arguments has
been that environmental litigation has caused loss of employ-
ment as a result of delay or abandonment of projects which
would have employed members of the industry. This argument
is not without merit, if, in fact, the pace of construction in the
economy is so slow as to prevent those restrained from obtain-
ing similar employment elsewhere. There appears little need
for a compensatory mechanism, however, if the erroneously
restrained defendants are able to secure similar temporary
employment. 6
94. Some of these concerns were mentioned by the district court in Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, which fixed a bond of $4.5 million for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction halting expansion of the San Francisco International Airport.
518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1975). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that a nominal bond of $1,000 should be imposed. Id. at 323.
95. See text accompanying notes 165-175 infra.
96. Courts have used this argument to reject the defendant's claimed economic
loss and have granted final injunctions for this reason. E.g., Minnesota PIRG v. Butz,
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Public entities and developers also criticize the increase in
construction costs caused by delays." These- claims deserve
closer scrutiny. Contracts between developers and public enti-
ties often contain provisions dealing with both work stoppages
and delays and provide protection against increased costs.
Where projects yield an income, inflation will usually increase
expected revenues. In addition, if the preliminary injunction
causes an environmental impact statement or report to be
changed, project operations can be altered, minimizing envi-
ronmental costs and possibly decreasing the overall costs of the
project. 8 The defendant's costs, however, may be seen as self-
imposed where, from the beginning, citizens have argued the
illegality of the project and the defendant was aware of its
potential liability."
More importantly, there appears to be a real lack of actual
harm to defendants as a result of compliance with preliminary
injunctions in environmental cases.' 0 The general absence of
loss calls into question the need for compensation. Moreover,
some environmental statutes have implied that delay and in-
creased costs are costs defendants should be expected to bear.,'
There are broader rationales that justify having the defendant
bear these losses.
As a question of loss shifting, it is justifiable to require the
defendant to absorb the losses incurred by an erroneous injunc-
tion. In an environmental suit, the defendant is usually in the
better position to absorb a loss occasioned by compliance with
an erroneous injunction than is the plaintiff. It is the defendant
who embarks upon the activity in the expectation of ultimately
making a profit, and the delay caused by a preliminary injunc-
tion may be seen as another cost of doing business. If these
costs are ultimately passed on to buyers, they will not fall
358 F. Supp. 586, 626 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
97. This was an argument advanced in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar,
518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1975). There the defendants filed affidavits showing that con-
struction costs were increasing at approximately 1% per month, and applied this
percentage to the projected costs of the projects as currently planned, arriving at the
estimated net increase in overall construction costs if the inflation rate continued.
Plaintiff's Brief of Points and Authorities Regarding Bond on Injunction Pending Ap-
peal, at 9, id. (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
98. 518 F.2d at 322.
99. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 1975).
100. This is the reason that efforts to impose mandatory bonds on environmental
plaintiffs have failed in California and Michigan, and nominal bonds are set by statute
in a number of states. See text accompanying notes 165-187 infra.
101. See text accompanying notes 124-133 infra.
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heavily on any one group but will be distributed more equally.
If the defendant is a public entity, the costs will be passed on
to the public.0 2 Thus, the importance of the capacity to bear
loss as a single factor in loss shifting should not be over-
looked.'03
In addition, it is equitable to require the defendant to
absorb his own losses. It is difficult to say that the plaintiff is
at fault for an erroneously issued preliminary injunction. Once
the judge agrees that a preliminary injunction should issue, he
has decided that the plaintiff will enjoy a probable success on
the merits, that he is threatened with a significant harm, and
that plaintiff's victory will satisfy the public interest. With this
stamp of judicial approval, who should justly bear the risk of
loss? Given the greater ability on the part of defendants to
absorb losses, it appears just to require defendants to bear the
risk of loss. In accordance with this rationale, many decisions
have fixed nominal bonds where a private developer has been
preliminarily enjoined."'
Where a governmental third party is involved in approving
the developer's decision or act, the question of risk allocation
is complicated, although there is still no justification for shift-
ing the loss to the plaintiff. One writer has asserted that:
[T]he developer is usually aware of the government's sta-
tutory obligations and his claim for damages, if any,
should more properly be asserted against the government
defendants who [potentially] made the error of law, than
against the innocent plaintiff by means of a high bond.0 5
Moreover, there are several ways in which a preliminary
injunction may actually work to save private and public defen-
dants considerable sums of money. First, a preliminary injunc-
tion often serves to clarify both the plaintiffs and defendant's
102. This rationale was recognized in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (lst Cir. 1973). Where both public entities and private
parties are defendants, both considerations apply. "[I]t would be a mistake to treat
a revenue loss to the government the same as pecuniary damage to a private party."
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971).
103. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 22-23 (4th ed. 1971).
104. E.g., Viavant v. Trans-Delta Oil & Gas Co., 7 E.R.C. 1423 (10th Cir. 1974);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1659 (4th Cir. 1972); West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971);
Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975) (injunc-
tion bond reduced from $100,000, as set by trial court, to $500).
105. Leshy, supra note 2, at 674. Indeed, many developers may invite legal error
in order to secure approval of their projects as proposed.
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rights early on, and prevents the economic waste which might
result from a suit brought after the defendant has committed
substantial resources to the project. For example:'"'
Builder plans a building on Blackacre. Neighbor be-
lieves it violates the zoning laws and will constitute a com-
mon law nuisance. If Neighbor intends a suit for injunc-
tion, early determination may save money, no matter who
is legally correct or who wins. If the building is built and
must later be destroyed or structurally changed to comply
with zoning laws, the economic waste is obvious and could
have been avoided by quick access to the courts. If the
building, though in violation of zoning ordinances, is al-
lowed to stand because of this waste factor and because
early relief was not sought, the building may cause other
economic loss in the form of diminished property values for
neighboring property. If it is assumed that the building is
proper in all respects, quick access to the courts to deter-
mine this fact will mean that the builder may proceed with
construction without either delay or needless risk.' 7
While there are several variables that might cause the pre-
cluded economic waste to be great or minimal,' the point is
clear; if legal action is inevitable, an early resort to the courts
will be less disruptive and costly. Simply as a matter of delay,
the adjudication of relief that is not provisional results in more
delay between filing and decision than does extraordinary re-
lief. Therefore, a substantial bond requirement will likely con-
tribute to economic waste to the extent that it deters prelimi-
nary relief.
Second, the moratorium provided by a preliminary injunc-
tion buys time for the parties to reevaluate the impact of a
project. Reevaluation may lead to the conclusion that the pro-
ject was not originally or is no longer economically or environ-
mentally viable, resulting in its cancellation and a savings to
the public. A preliminary injunction, for example, halted work
on the Cross Florida Barge Canal and ultimately resulted in
President Nixon's decision to abandon the project at a savings
of approximately $130 million, the cost of completion of the
106. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 1095 n.13.
107. Other examples include the construction of a plant with questionable pollu-
tion control equipment and the building of a dam on a whitewater river.
108. Two of the more important variables include the cost of modification neces-
sary to bring the defendant into compliance with law, and the extent of damage to the
plaintiffs or the environment caused by noncompliance.
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project. °0 Thus, the importance of this "time out" function of
preliminary injunctions should not be ignored.
Substantial bonds can also be counterproductive and
cause more delay and economic harm than would the imposi-
tion of no bond or a nominal bond. In many cases, defendants
can avoid losses by not seeking a bond in the first instance.
Where the defendant requests and obtains a substantial bond
from the trial court, it invites a trip to the court of appeals or
supreme court to review the amount of the bond as to whether
its exaction constitutes an abuse of discretion. Since the
chances of having a substantial bond overturned on appeal are
good, an eventual vacation results in needless expense of judi-
cial resources, increased delay and costs to defendants, and no
progress towards the termination of the litigation."10 Defen-
dants, therefore, can mitigate the costs and delays by foregoing
an injunction bond."'
The Bond and Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws
Prosecution and enforcement of environmental law is no
longer exclusively the business of public officials."' Powerful
legislation has been enacted at both federal ' 3 and state ' 4 levels
permitting and encouraging citizen enforcement.
Citizen enforcement is significant in that it supplements
the small, overworked staffs of public enforcers and is less
109. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878
(D.D.C. 1971); Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Calloway, 489 F.2d 567, 570-71 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974)
(containing the Presidential Order).
110. See Letter from Antonio Rossman, Esq., to Governor Edmund G. Brown,
Jr. (Aug. 28, 1978) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
111. A possible alternative for recovery by the injured defendant is the filing of
a counteraction against the plaintiff for malicious prosecution. These are not useful,
however, because defendants are unlikely to recover substantial funds from under-
funded environmental groups and because of the difficulty in proving the requisite
elements of the cause of action. See generally Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit
Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and
Proposed Solutions, 74 MICH. L. REv. 106 (1975).
112. See W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 75-76. See generally J. SAX, supra note 3;
Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field-Peril or Promise, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 407 (1972); Dimento, supra note 75; Comment, Standing on the Side of
the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q.
561 (1971); Comment, State Legislation to Grant Standing: Questions, Answers and
Alternatives, 2 ENVT'L L. 313 (1972).
113. For a thorough review of federal environmental statutes allowing citizen
suits, see W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 75-89.
114. For a review of citizen suit provisions under state laws, see id. at 170-80,
809-22; Dimento, supra note 75.
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costly. Private parties may also be in a better position to weigh
the costs and benefits of a particular project, and the competi-
tion from citizens sharpens the response of institutional repre-
sentatives."15 Where private citizens challenge the acts of gov-
ernments, the need for citizen enforcement is clear. Where
citizens seek legal review of administrative agency action, other
factors justify the breath of fresh air that citizen enforcement
brings; namely, the administrative agencies may be overly def-
erential to the interests they regulate,"' whereas courts are
apolitical and practiced in the art of balancing legal and politi-
cal issues."7 It should not be forgotten, however, that citizen
litigation is not a substitute for public participation in the
decision-making process, but rather a last resort to determine
and enforce legal rights. The repeated provision for citizen suits
in environmental legislation may be read as an endorsement of
active citizen litigation."'
The importance of citizen litigation is well-recognized by
public officials. Regarding the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act (NEPA), Congress has declared that: "[I]t is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation
with. . . concerned public and private organizations, to use all
practical means and measures . . . to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony . . . ."" Russell Train, then Chairman of the Presi-
dent's Council on Environmental Quality, stated: "Private liti-
gation before courts and administrative agencies has been and
will continue to be an important environmental protection
technique supplementing and reinforcing government environ-
mental protection programs."'' 0
State laws also provide for citizen participation. For exam-
ple, in passing the California Environmental Quality Act, the
legislature declared that: "Every citizen has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environ-
ment,"' 2 ' and that "the interrelationship of policies and prac-
115. J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 829 (1975).
116. See M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. 294-313 (1972).
117. Dimento, supra note 75, at 420-21.
118. J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 115, at 829.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4221(a) (1976).
120. Letter from Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality, to Randolph W. Thrower, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Sept. 30,
1970), reprinted in [1970] 1 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 745.
121. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(e) (West 1977).
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tices in the management of natural resources and waste dis-
posal requires systematic and concerted efforts by public and
private interests to enhance environmental quality and to con-
trol environmental pollution."'' 2 Other environmental legisla-
tion shares these policies.'
One would expect that a large bond would stifle the very
litigation that Congress and the legislatures intended to pro-
mote. This expectation is frequently cited by the courts as a
factor in their decision to require only a nominal bond of envi-
ronmental plaintiffs. 2' Where NEPA suits are concerned, it is
now common for courts to cite this rationale and thereby set
nominal bonds. The body of such cases has been referred to as
representing a "doctrine,"' 25 the "NEPA litigation excep-
tion,"'26 and even a "rule."'2 7
There is no reason, however, to restrict this rationale to the
cases involving NEPA. Where a legislature has provided for
citizen enforcement of environmental laws and elsewhere de-
clares the importance of such suits in the statutory scheme, the
courts should be slow to tamper with such policy by imposing
substantial bond requirements. "'
The private attorney general concept'29 is also applicable.
To the extent that private citizens are supplementing the en-
forcement capabilities of public enforcers, there is little justifi-
cation for imposing a bond that inhibits such suits. Indeed,
122. Id. § 21000(f).
123. For an even stronger statement of the need for citizen participation under
the California Coastal Act, see id. § 30000.
124. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1975);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd,
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
125. Leshy, supra note 2, at 674.
126. Bond Amounts in NEPA Litigation, supra note 72, at 583.
127. Id. at 589.
128. A reviewer of the Florida Environmental Protection Act permitting substan-
tial bonds has stated:
The statutory section allowing the bond unfortunately could condi-
tion justice on the complaining party's solvency. Therefore, the courts
should require bonds in only the most extreme cases. If a bond is required
frequently, many private citizens might be deprived of the judicial hear-
ing of grievances that [the Florida] EPA statutory standing is intended
to provide.
Note, The Florida Environmental Protection Act of 1971: The Citizen's Role in Envi-
ronmental Management, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 736, 761 (1974).
129. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per
curiam); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977); King
& Plater, supra note 16, at 27; Sax & Conner, supra note 77, at 1076-77.
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several cases have seized upon this concept as a vehicle to
require nominal bonds. 30 Going one step further, one might ask
why a citizen suing as a private attorney general is required to
post a bond when the attorney general is not? Public enforcers
are routinely exempted from the filing of a bond, 3' and it seems
somewhat illogical to exact a bond from the private environ-
mental plaintiff who litigates to achieve the same goals.
The ultimate concern, however, must be that large bond
requirements will reduce or preclude the benefits of environ-
mental protection and result in greater environmental degrada-
tion. One of the most important factors that has led public
agencies and private parties to comply with environmental
laws has been the possibility that someone would force compli-
ance through the courts. Without this threat, many agencies
and private parties would undoubtedly embark on paths that
would result in reduced public participation and a disregard of
environmental laws. In states where the majority of environ-
mental cases are brought by private citizens, such as Califor-
nia, 32 substantial bonds repeatedly imposed would eliminate
most enforcement of state and local environmental laws.
133
The Preliminary Injunction Standard as a Deterrent to
Frivolous Suits
The preliminary injunction standard has several features
that deter frivolous suits and ensure that unmeritorious actions
do not receive preliminary relief. As set forth previously, the
preliminary injunction issues only in circumstances of immedi-
ate and serious need where the plaintiff can show both an irre-
parable injury and a legal right that must be protected. The
equities must weigh in favor of granting the plaintiff relief. The
public interest must also be served by the preliminary injunc-
tion. Finally, the plaintiff must show that he has a reasonable
probability of success on the merits.' 3 The preliminary injunc-
130. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1975);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1659 (4th Cir. 1972).
131. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 529 (West 1954).
132. See Cal. Office of Planning & Research, California Environmental Quality
Act Litigation Study (Apr., 1976) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
133. This was also the conclusion of one analysis of a recent California bill that
would have allowed courts to require large bonds of environmental plaintiffs. Friends
of the Earth, Legislative Analysis for S.B. 1667, at 3 (Aug. 22, 1978) (on file at Santa
Clara Law Review).
134. See notes 26-38 and accompanying text supra.
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tion puts a heavy burden on the plaintiff and demands that the
judge explicitly consider the possibility of the plaintiff's ulti-
mate success.
The preliminary injunction test eliminates "strike" suits
and frivolous claims.'35 Those who fear crank suits by
"environmental nuts" should be calmed by the words of Profes-
sor Sax:
In a hearing on an application for preliminary relief, the
court must make an informed, though tentative, judgment
both as to the significance of the interests alleged to be at
stake and as to the likelihood that the plaintiffs might
prevail on the merits-that is whether they have a legal
claim that is not frivolous. The proceeding for preliminary
relief thereby provides an expeditious screening process.'3
If the judge believes the lawsuit does not meet the rigorous
preliminary injunction test, preliminary relief will be denied.
If the plaintiff is convinced that justice has not been done, the
denial may be appealed or the plaintiff may seek a full trial on
the merits.
Clearly, then, no preliminary injunction ever issues merely
because the plaintiff seeks one. Only a trained judge has the
knowledge and authority to properly scrutinize the plaintiff's
claims and legitimize them through the granting of an injunc-
tion. "Judges are most reluctant-as any sensible individual
would be-to restrain important and extremely costly projects
... [I]f there is any one quality which predominantly char-
acterizes the usual courtroom proceeding, it is judicial cau-
tiousness."' 37 Attorneys for environmental plaintiffs are aware
of these attitudes and are careful to screen cases thoroughly.' 6
Further, since the majority of environmental plaintiffs' attor-
neys work pro bono, they have little interest in wasting their
135. "[Tlhe showing required for a preliminary injunction (i.e., likelihood of
success on the merits of the case, consideration of irreparable harm to the parties and
the public interest) itself provides ample protection against a frivolous injunction."
Cal. Office of Planning & Research, Enrolled Bill Report-S.B. 1415, at 3 (July 6,1978)
(on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
136. See J. SAX, supra note 3, at 116.
137. Id. at 118, 119.
138. A California attorney with wide experience in representing environmental
groups stated: "Neither I nor any other environmental attorney I know of brings an
action unless it can clearly satisfy the standard of at least some 'reasonable possibility
that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment ... ' Letter from Antonio Rossman to
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (Aug. 28, 1978) (emphasis in original) (on file at
Santa Clara Law Review). See also note 71 supra.
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time on losing lawsuits in return for meager or nonexistent
monetary compensation.''
Many courts also rely on the preliminary injunction stan-
dard as a major justification for requiring only a nominal bond
of environmental plaintiffs.' The courts most often emphasize
that it is the requirement of a showing of the likelihood of
success that provides adequate protection for fearful defen-
dants.4 0
The proposition that the preliminary injunction test
screens frivolous suits and protects defendants from losses
caused by unmeritorious suits can be tested in those states that
have enacted environmental laws requiring only nominal bonds
of environmental plaintiffs. In such states, the preliminary in-
junction test is virtually the only protection shielding the de-
fendants. Michigan, with its environmental protection act con-
taining liberal standing rules' and a $500 bond limit,'42 is such
a state.
A study conducted six years after the passage of the Michi-
gan act revealed that 1) very few frivolous cases have been
brought, 2) the delay caused by unmeritorious injunctions has
been small, and 3) little, if any, economic damage has been
138.1 The California Supreme Court noted in Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n
v. City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979)
that court awarded attorney's fees for environmental lawsuits could be granted only if
such litigation was successful.
139. E.g., environmental cases: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d
323 (9th Cir. 1975); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 1972); Viavant v.
Trans-Delta Oil & Gas Co., 7 E.R.C. 1423, 1426 (10th Cir. 1974); State of Ala. ex rel
Bagley v. Corps of Engineers, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1276 (N.D. Ala. 1976); other cases:
Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
140. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
141. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (West Supp. 1978-1979) provides:
The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any in-
strumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof,
any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other
legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdic-
tion where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declara-
tory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision
thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdi-
vision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organi-
zation or other legal entity for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment
or destruction.
142. Id. § 691.1202a provides:
If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the plain-
tiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or judgment which might be
rendered against him in an action brought under this act the court may
order the plaintiff to post a surety bond of cash not to exceed $500.00.
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sustained by Michigan industry."' The study analyzed twenty-
seven cases in which preliminary relief had been granted, ap-
proximately one-third of those cases filed under the act. In
sixteen of the cases, few of which involved extensive delay, the
preliminary injunction was upheld. Of the eleven cases ulti-
mately won by the defendants, all either raised important is-
sues, were disposed of expeditiously, or caused little income
loss to defendants;"' where preliminary injunctions were de-
nied, such cases have neither "disrupted industrial output nor
caused concern over delay.""' Recent attempts to amend the
Michigan act to increase the bond requirement and the sound
defeat of such attempts by the legislature "' may be interpreted
as evidence of the effectiveness of the preliminary injunction
standard as a screening device and a rejection of claims that it
results in significant economic harm to defendants.
While it could be argued that the Michigan experience is
merely a handful of cases in one state, other states with similar
statutes have experienced similar results. Data collected in a
1975 mail survey in states with strong environmental legisla-
tion like Michigan's show no evidence of industry exodus as a
result of environmental suits."7 The judiciary has expeditiously
disposed of the few frivolous suits that have arisen,'48 and more-
over, the vast majority of preliminary injunctions in environ-
mental actions have been sustained."49
The preliminary injunction test offers appropriate protec-
tion in those states where nominal bonds are exacted from
environmental plaintiffs. It appears to perform the function of
deterrence and largely obviates the need for compensation. Al-
though reliance on the preliminary injunction standards to pro-
tect defendants from unmeritorious suits may cause slightly
fewer preliminary injunctions to be issued, this is not necessar-
ily a result to be eschewed: judges should always carefully
143. Haynes, Michigan Environmental Protection Act in its Sixth Year: Sub-
stantive Environmental Law from Citizen Suits, 93 J. URB. L. 590, 651-58 (1976). These
findings parallel those made 3 years after the passage of the Act. See Sax & Dimento,
supra note 80, at 43-47.
144. Haynes, supra note 143, at 651-58.
145. Id. at 658.
146. See id. at 668-69.
147. See Dimento, supra note 75, at 443 n.160.
148. Id. at 452; King & Plater, supra note 16, at 82. "[T]he courts appear quite
capable of weeding. . .out [frivolous suits], and the burdens of litigation remain such
that attorneys are reluctant to sue unless they are likely to prevail." Id.
149. Leshy, supra note 2, at 675; J. SAX, supra note 3, at 118.
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weigh the equities and the effects of the preliminary injunction
upon the parties.
The Policy Decision: Security for Defendant's Prospective
Harm v. Preclusion of Environmental Protection
There will be cases in which the plaintiffs should receive
ecological protection and in which the defendant will face cer-
tain prospective economic injury as a result of complying with
a preliminary injunction. If the environmental plaintiff lacks
the resources necessary to post the bond required for issuance
of a preliminary injunction, the court is faced with an unpleas-
ant dilemma. The court may set a nominal bond, which will
allow the plaintiff the relief to which he is legally entitled,
although it will probably subject the defendant to some eco-
nomic loss. Alternatively, the court may set a bond that will
compensate the defendant for his probable economic loss but
stop the lawsuit and preclude the environmental protection
that plaintiffs action would have provided. In this situation,
the bond requirement serves to juxtapose two conflicting
"rights": the right of the plaintiff to environmental protection
and the right of the defendant to security and compensation for
the economic harm inflicted should the preliminary injunction
not be sustained.' 5° At this stage of the proceedings, neither the
judge nor the parties have the benefit of foresight and it is
unknown whether a final injunction will be granted. When
these "rights" are in irreconcilable conflict, a decision must be
made as to which will supersede the other.
The legislatures and particularly the courts have decided
that the right of the environmental plaintiff to temporary relief
that furthers environmental protection is to be favored over the
need of the defendant for compensation. This policy decision
is significant for it recognizes the importance of preliminary
relief in environmental cases.
The NEPA has been interpreted by the courts as stating
that costs incurred by a defendant from delay in compliance
with the Act are outweighed by the benefits of environmentally
informed decision-making."5' Judge Skelly Wright put it suc-
150. For another explication of the conflict, see Sax & Conner, supra note 77, at
1076-77.
151. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 1975); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1975); Greene County Planning Bd.
v. FPC, 455 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
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cinctly in 1971 when he observed:
Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible. They must
be complied with to the fullest extent .... Considerations
of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not
suffice to strip the section of its fundamental import-
ance. "I
Subsequent NEPA cases have extended this policy judgment
and minimized the importance of claims of harm from private
parties by requiring only nominal bonds of environmental
plaintiffs.'53
The same policy decision is applicable at the state level.
Where state courts have indicated that their environmental
policy acts are modeled on NEPA or that NEPA interpreta-
tions are persuasive,' it is logical to adopt NEPA interpreta-
tions in making the same policy decision at the state level.
Other states have enacted this policy decision by statutorily
limiting the amount of the bond that a court can impose under
certain environmental protection laws. 5'
The policy decision to favor temporary environmental
preservation is further documented by those cases in which
environmental plaintiffs have been allowed to post a bond that
is significantly less than the amount that would adequately
compensate the defendant for his prospective economic loss.
California has produced a line of cases in which environmental
plaintiffs were not required to post a bond, or were required to
post only a nominal bond.5 '
449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972); Sherr v. Volpe,
446 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337
F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
152. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). "[A] direct result of NEPA-caused delays
that Congress undoubtedly was aware of, is that jobs created by a construction project
might be interrupted and that the initial employment of some persons might be post-
poned." Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 497 n.19 (2d Cir. 1975).
153. E.g., Viavant v. Trans-Delta Oil & Gas Co., 7 E.R.C. 1423 (10th Cir. 1974);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1659 (4th Cir. 1972); West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232, 236 (4th Cir.
1971); Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla. v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp. 69, 76 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
154. E.g., California. See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 80,
529 P.2d 66, 74, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 42 (1974); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervi-
sors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 260-61, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057-59, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761,
769-70 (1972).
155. See statutes cited in notes 183, 186, 187 infra.
156. Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angeles, 2 Civ. No.
52606 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 19, 1978) (supreme court vacated an appellate court order
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The most recent California Supreme Court ruling vacated
the decision of an appellate court requiring a citizens' group to
post a $50,000 bond as a condition for the continuation of a writ
of supersedeas. In Laurel Hills Homeowners Association v. City
Council of Los Angeles, the supreme court directed the lower
court to set a supersedeas bond "which shall not exceed a nomi-
nal bond."' 57 The homeowners' group argued that they were
acting as private attorneys general and that the prohibitive
undertaking required by the court of appeals improperly de-
nied them the right to enforce the California Environmental
Quality Act. 5 ' The real party in interest, a private developer
who sought to construct a subdivision near plaintiffs' property
in suburban Los Angeles, claimed a loss of at least $25,000 per
month as a result of the delay caused by the plaintiffs. The
developer argued that the plaintiffs were not private attorneys
general inasmuch as they had claimed that they would receive
economic and aesthetic benefits if the subdivision was not
built.5
requiring a bond of $50,000 as a condition for continuation of a writ of supersedeas and
directed lower court to set a bond "not to exceed a nominal amount"); Bozung v.
Ventura County LAFCO, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975)
(supreme court stayed substantial development without requiring any undertaking);
No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1973)
(no undertaking); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.
3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972) (no undertaking); Burger v. County
of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975) (injunction bond set by
trial court at $100,000 reduced to a nominal bond of $500); Nixon v. County of Los
Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 3d 370, 113 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1974) (stay issued without requiring
plaintiff to post undertaking); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 377 (1973) (no undertaking).
But cf. Venice Canals Resident Homeowners' Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 72 Cal. App.
3d 675, 140 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1977) (court had discretion to require an undertaking as a
condition of stay issued pursuant to section 1094.5(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure;
court upheld $50,000 bond). It should be noted that of the three cases cited for the
proposition that a substantial bond was appropriate to protect the rights of innocent
third parties, one was reversed on appeal and a nominal bond set, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 4 E.R.C. 1659 (4th Cir. 1975), one reduced a $4,500,000
undertaking to $1,000, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.
1975), and the third involved a large multinational corporation seeking to avoid appli-
cation of the Clean Air Act and for whom $30,000 was in fact a nominal bond, Ana-
conda v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482
F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
157. 2 Civ. No. 52606 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 29, 1979).
158. Petition for Hearing, Temporary Stay Order in the Nature of Mandate,
Supersedeas, and Other Appropriate Relief. Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City
Council of Los Angeles at 8-17, 2 Civ. No. 52606 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 29, 1979) (on file
at Santa Clara Law Review).
159. Real Party in Interest's Preliminary Opposition to Petition for Hearing,
Temporary Stay Order in the Nature of Mandate, Supersedeas, and Other Appropriate
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The supreme court in Laurel Hills rejected the contentions
of the real party in interest by requiring only a nominal bond
of the plaintiffs.6 0 There was no written decision in the case,
although an attorney for the homeowners stated that the ruling
"is a rejection of the concept that a substantial bond or prohib-
itive bond should be required as a condition of maintaining the
status quo pending appeal in a homeowners action."''
The ruling, however, can be read more broadly. Since the
$100 bond set by the court of appeals on remand" 2 could not
compensate the real party in interest, the interest of the plain-
tiffs in obtaining judicial review in an environmental case was
found to be paramount. And because the superior court had
initially decided against the plaintiffs' claims and in favor of
the City of Los Angeles after a full hearing on the merits, the
ruling clearly represents a decision to weigh the need for envi-
ronmental protection over defendant's economic losses caused
by the delay.
This policy decision should not be viewed as absolute.
Where financial resources exist and the continuance of the ac-
tion will in no way be obstructed by the requirement of a bond
adequate to compensate the defendant for economic losses, it
may be only just to require such a bond in light of existing
statutes. 163
Thus, the policy decision to favor at least temporary envi-
ronmental protection over probable harm to defendants cuts
across several dimensions. The cases cited above adhere to this
policy decision regardless of whether the prospective harms are
Relief. Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angeles at 2-6, 10-13, 2
Civ. No. 52606 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 29, 1979) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
160. The order and its attendant facts cast serious doubt on the validity of the
Venice Canals Resident Homeowners' Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 72 Cal. App. 3d 675, 140
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1977), where a bond was upheld.
161. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 31, 1978, at 1 col. 1.
162. Id.
163. E.g., California v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, Nos. 74-2456, 74-2924
(9th Cir. 1974) (state sought to enjoin construction by private developers; $3,500,000
bond set); Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 69 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973) (multinational corporation sought to avoid
applicationof the Clean Air Act; $30,000 bond set); National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
325 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (national corporation
sought a temporary injunction to prevent cancelation of a contract for sale of helium
to the U.S. Government; $75,000 bond set); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F.
Supp. 78 (D. Kan. 1973) (after the Department of the Interior completed an environ-
mental impact statement, the helium company amended its complaint to allege that
the EIS was inadequate and sought continuation of the preliminary injunction;
$2,000,000 bond set).
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incurred by public or private defendants.' 4 The judgment also
has been approved in the legislatures and in various federal and
state courts. This policy decision merits further entrenchment
in the law.
LEGISLATIVE TRENDS
Although every state has a general bonding statute or judi-
cial decision that establishes the power of the courts to require
a bond of the plaintiff seeking preliminary relief, some states
have particular bonding statutes applicable to environmental
plaintiffs. The most recent activity in California involved legis-
lative attempts to specifically mandate substantial bonds for
a defined class of environmental plaintiffs.
Bills were introduced' that would allow a defendant to
seek a court order requiring the plaintiff to furnish a written
undertaking as security for costs, attorneys' fees, and any dam-
ages incurred by the defendant as a result of the delay in a
"construction project.""' The undertaking could be sought "in
any action brought by any plaintiff, other than the state, a
county, or a municipal corporation to enjoin a construction
project which has received all legally required licenses and per-
mits."'6 7 The undertaking would be required if the defendant
could show 1) that the plaintiff has "no reasonable possibility
of obtaining a judgment against the moving defendant" and 2)
that the plaintiff will not suffer "undue economic hardship" by
filing the undertaking.'16
These bills were supported by the construction industry to
discourage frivolous lawsuits directed against construction pro-
164. One court has indicated that the private defendant's harms may be entitled
to greater protection. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1975).
165. Cal. Legis. 1975-1976 Reg. Sess., S.B. 1812 (introduced by Senator Berry-
hill, March 16, 1976); Cal. Legis. 1977-1978 Reg. Sess., S.B. 571 (introduced by Senator
Foran, March 16, 1977); Cal. Legis. 1977-1978 Reg. Sess., S.B. 1415 (introduced by
Senator Foran, January 25, 1978); Cal. Legis. 1977-1978 Reg. Sess., S.B. 1667 (origi-
nally introduced by Senator Song, amended to include the bond provision of Senator
Foran on August 18, 1978) (all on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
166. A "construction project" as defined by the bills would include but is not
restricted to "the construction, surveying, design, specifications, alteration, repair,
improvement, maintenance, removal of or demolition of any building, highway, road,
parking facility, bridge, railroad, airport, pier or dock, excavation or other structure,
development or other improvement to real or personal property." See bills, note 165,
supra.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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jects. Opponents of the proposals included the Resources
Agency of California, the Governor's Office of Planning and
Research, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth, and environmental lawyers. Three of the
bills were passed by overwhelming majorities,' and a fourth
died on the senate floor for lack for action in the rush to pass
Proposition 13 legislation. 170 The three that passed were subse-
quently vetoed by Governor Brown, who saw no need for fur-
ther protection for corporate defendants.'
There were numerous criticisms of the bills. They not only
pertained to preliminary injunctions, but also to writs of man-
date.' In addition, the bills applied to public agency plaintiffs,
such as the California air pollution control districts and the
California Coastal Commission.' While the legislation would
have required a court to find that the plaintiff would suffer "no
undue hardship" in posting the bond, it did not require the
court to consider the total for which the plaintiff might ulti-
mately become liable.' The "undue hardship" test is vague
and could conceivably eliminate other factors-particularly
the public interest-in deciding the amount of the bond. For-
169. S.B. 1819 passed the Senate 31-0 on June 3, 1976, and the Assembly by 70-
0 on June 28, 1976. S.B. 571 passed the Senate by a 40-0 vote on May 7, 1977, and the
Assembly by a vote of 61-2 on August 8, 1977. S.B. 1415 passed the Senate by a vote
of 26-2 on March 30, 1978, and the Assembly by a vote of 70-8.
170. Cal. Legis. 1977-1978 Reg. Sess., S.B. 1667. See note 165 supra.
171. Governor Brown vetoed S.B. 1819 on July 10, 1976, stating: "The additional
protections which this bill would provide for certain defendants appear to be unwar-
ranted in view of the protection afforded all defendants by existing statutes and court
practice." S.B. 571 was vetoed on September 24, 1977. The Governor vetoed S.B. 1415
on July 12, 1978, and stated: "I vetoed this bill twice before because I did not find
evidence that its provisions would curtail questionable lawsuits. No additional infor-
mation has been presented this year that alters my earlier conclusion."
172. Friends of the Earth, Legislative Analysis for S.B. 1667, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1978)
(on file at Santa Clara Law Review); Letter from John Zierold, Sierra Club Legislative
Representative, to All Members of the Assembly (regarding S.B. 1667) (August 28,
1978) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
An amendment to S.B. 1667 changed the language "in any action" to "on granting
an injunction," rendering the bill rather harmless. Read with this change, the judge
who had just granted a preliminary injunction (which involved a finding of likelihood
of success on the merits) would be required to find that "there is no reasonable possibil-
ity of the plaintiff's success on the merits" in order to trigger the bond requirement.
The chances of the same judge arriving at these two contradictory conclusions about
the same suit appear slim to say the least.
173. Letter from Mark Vandervelder, Friends of the Earth, California Legislative
Office, to Members of the Assembly (regarding S.B. 1667) (August 23, 1978) (on file
at Santa Clara Law Review).
174. Cal. Office of Planning & Research, Enrolled Bill Report-S.B. 1415, at 2
(on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
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feiture of the bond would be mandatory regardless of the even-
tual reason the plaintiff lost the case, thus eliminating judicial
discretion in awarding damages.' 5 Finally, the existing bond
statute was seen to provide adequate protection for defendants,
and at any rate, the appellate courts retained the power to
reduce substantial bonds for environmental plaintiffs.
This legislation is ill-conceived, contrary to the trends es-
tablished by the courts, and severely detrimental to the future
of effective environmental litigation. Perhaps the best reason
for the failure of this legislation in California has been the
repeated inability of its proponents to produce any significant
evidence of economic injury caused by unmeritorious environ-
mental litigation.
Two similar bills were defeated in Michigan in 19736 and
1975.' 77 In 1973, a bill was introduced in the state senate to
amend the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA)
to require posting of "a surety or cash bond approved and in
an amount fixed by the Court" as a condition precedent to
injunction of continued construction where any required per-
mit had been obtained and "construction of a building or other
structure" had begun.'78 If the final injunction was not issued,
the bill would have required payment of damages resulting
from the increase in construction costs due to an erroneous
injunction. The most frequently voiced objection was the pre-
clusion of citizen environmental litigation. The bill died in
committee.'79
Two years later, a bill was introduced to require a bond of
plaintiffs suing under MEPA in a figure not less than "the
amount of damages and costs which may be assessed against"
the plaintiff.80 Proponents of the bill argued that its purpose
was to increase investor confidence in Michigan industry. A
house of representatives' analysis pointed out that investors
175. Id. As this article goes to press, another bill, similar to S.B. 1667, has been
introduced in the California Legislature. See notes 165 & 172, supra. This new bill, S.B.
698, would further limit to $500,000.00, plaintiffs liability for the undertaking. Cal.
Legis. 1978-1979 Reg. Sess., S.B. 698 (introduced by Senator Foran, March 21, 1979)
(on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
176. Mich. Legis. S.B. 751 (1973), introduced by Senator Bouwsma, and its
subsequent history are chronicled in Sax & Dimento, supra note 80, at 47-48.
177. The bill, Mich. Legis. S.B. 1003 (1975), introduced by Senator Mack, and
its controversy is described in Haynes, supra note 143, at 668-72.
178. See note 176 supra.
179. Id.
180. See note 177 supra.
1979]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
had not neglected Michigan industry and there was no evi-
dence that jobs had been lost or industry migration had been
caused by MEPA lawsuits.' In "a confused shouting debate,"
the house soundly defeated the bill by a vote of 68-29.s2
Like the California bills, the Michigan legislation would
have effectively prohibited all but the wealthiest plaintiffs
from seeking environmental protection. Fortunately, these bills
were defeated or vetoed. Thus, it appears that legislation that
would increase the amount of bonds set for environmental
plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions or relief has been
unsuccessful.
A better approach is to follow the lead of at least five
states and enact legislation that would set a ceiling on the
bonds required of environmental plaintiffs." 3 These states have
attempted to reconcile the usual bond requirements, which
would effectively preclude valuable citizen litigation, with the
desire by defendants to be free of unmeritorious litigation. The
compromise legislation that has resulted empowers the court to
order the environmental plaintiff to post a bond not to exceed
$500.111 Many of these statutes were modeled after MEPA
which provides:
If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the sol-
vency of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any
cost or judgment which might be rendered against him in
an action brought under this act the court may order the
plaintiff to post a surety bond or cash not to exceed
$500.00.1'1
States that statutorily limit bonds for environmental
plaintiffs have found them successful. They have not been
flooded with environmental litigation, have not experienced
larger numbers of frivolous suits, nor have they suffered signifi-
181. Mich. House of Representatives, Analysis of S.B. 1003, at 2 (August 4,
1975), cited in Haynes, supra note 143, at 669 n.336.
182. See note 177 supra. The bill was later amended in the house and the house's
changes were rejected by the senate. Apparently, the bill died in conference committee.
183. The five states are: Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 214, § 7A (Mi-
chie/Law. Co-op .1974); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.550 (1973); New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A:35 A-9 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); and South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 34A-10-3 (1977 rev.) One state, however, specifically allows the court to impose
a bond sufficient to indemnify the defendant when an environmental plaintiff seeks
temporary relief. MINN. STATS. ANN. § 116B.07 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
184. Id.
185. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
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cant economic setbacks. Some statutes go so far as to eliminate
the bond requirement completely where private litigation acts
to enforce environmental laws. Perhaps ironically, California
itself forbids the exaction of a bond from any plaintiff who
would seek to preliminarily enjoin projects that violate the Cal-
ifornia Coastal Act.'86 Similarly, no bond may be required of
plaintiffs who sue public entities to enforce the duties imposed
by the Act."7
The trend, if one can be discovered, appears to be towards
nominal bond statutes for environmental plaintiffs. Prior to the
1970's, special statutes for public interest plaintiffs were non-
existent. In the last decade, several states have enacted laws
adopting nominal bonds. Others have rejected attempts to
impose substantial bonds. This result is perhaps best explained
by the perceived importance of environmental citizen suits and
lack of economic harm to defendants by low bonds. As more
jurisdictions confront the issue, this trend may be expected to
grow.
CONCLUSION
The question of injunction bonds in environmental litiga-
tion provides a microcosmic synthesis of a wider clash between
the two societal goals of environmental protection for the pub-
186. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30803 (West 1977) provides:
Any person may maintain an action for any violation of this division.
On a prima facie showing of a violation of this division, preliminary
equitable relief shall be issued to restrain any further violation of this
division. No bond shall be required for an action under this section.
The importance of public participation in coastal management is underscored by CAL.
PUB. REs. CODE § 30006 (West 1977) which states:
The Legislature further finds and declares that the public has a right
to fully participate in decisions affecting coastal planning, conservation,
and development; that achievement of sound coastal conservation and
development is dependent upon public understanding and support; and
that the continuing planning and implementation of programs for coastal
conservation and development should include the widest opportunity for
public participation.
See Sanders v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 661, 126 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1975);
No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. App. 3d 8, 123 Cal. Rptr. 589
(1975); see generally Miller, Enforcing the Coastal Act-Citizen's Suits and Attorney's
Fees 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 237 (1974).
187. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30804 (West 1977). But cf. Venice Canals Resident
Homeowners' Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 72 Cal. App. 3d 675, 140 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1977)
(neither the 1972 Coastal Act nor the 1976 Coastal Act prohibits a court from requiring
posting of bond as condition of stay in actions giving persons aggrieved by decision or
action of coastal commission right to judicial review by filing for writ of mandate under
§ 30801 of the Public Resources Code).
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lic and economic protection for commercial and public defen-
dants. Plaintiffs stress the existence of an immediate environ-
mental injury; defendants point to the need for economic pro-
tection should an initial decision for plaintiffs be reversed. In
the individual case before a court, the bonding decision must
be defined by the equities of the case and the boundaries of
statutory and case law.
This article has offered several rationales for the establish-
ment of nominal bonds for public interest environmental plain-
tiffs. Environmental plaintiffs cannot post substantial bonds.
It is undesirable to require non-profit groups or private persons
to post bonds in order to enforce laws that benefit the public
weal. Citizen enforcement of environmental laws is essential
given the need for environmental protection and the scarce
public resources allocated to enforcement.
The preliminary injunction test serves as an effective de-
terrent to frivolous suits. The need for the bond as a compensa-
tory tool has been overplayed, and there are often good reasons
for having defendants bear the cost of complying with the pre-
liminary order. Finally, courts and legislators have frequently
decided that, as a matter of policy, immediate environmental
protection is to be favored over the prospective economic harm
to defendants.
If the public interest environmental plaintiff is to be en-
couraged to vindicate legal rights, the hurdle of the injunction
bond must be lowered. Such a change should contribute to a
quality environment, a universally acknowledged goal.
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